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ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN THE PHILIPPINES
George W. Pugh*
Eastern and Western civilizations meet and merge in the
Philippines; and the two great legal systems of the West, the
common law and the civil law, also meet and mix. The result
is an intriguing admixture of laws and cultures. When Magel-
lan came in 1521, the Islands had been largely peopled by suc-
cessive migrations of pygmies (or negritos), Indonesians, and
Malays.1 Other cultures, however, had had their influences -
Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Arabic.2 Although the existing
legal system was primitive, written "codes" did exist, and copies
of at least two of them have been preserved.3
During the 333 years intervening between 1565, when Spain
is said to have completed her conquest of the Islands, and 1898,
when the Americans came, 4 Spanish law prevailed. 5 The Islands
thus acquired the traditions of the civil law, the system arising
from Roman law and generally prevailing in the countries of
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. This article was prepared
by the author for The Comparative Study of the Administration of Justice, estab-
lished under the terms of a grant from the Ford Foundation to Loyola University
School of Law (Chicago), which reserves all rights. It was prepared while the
author was in the Philippines, summer of 1965, and is published concurrently in
the Louisiana Law Review and the Philippine Law Journal. For valuable re-
search aid in the preparation of this manuscript, the writer is indebted to Mr.
Edcel Lagman and Mr. Ruben Torres, senior law students, University of the
Philippines.
1. 1 ZAIDE, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 21-27 (1957).
2. Id. at 44-47.
3. Id. at 59-63; FRANCISCO, LEGAL HISTORY 43742 (1951) [hereinafter cited
as FRANCISCO].
4. The legal history of the Philippines may be divided into five periods: pre-
Spanish period; period of the Spanish regime (1565-1898) ; period of American
rule (1898-1935) ; commonwealth or transition period (1935-1946), including the
time the Philippines were occupied by the Japanese during World War II; and
the period since independence (1946- ). See FRANCISCO 432; GAMBOA, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PHILIPPINE LAw 69 (1955) [hereinafter cited as GAMBOA].
5. For convenient summaries as to the legal system prevailing under the
Spanish, see Laurel, What Lessons May Be Derived by the Philippine Islands
from the Legal History of Louisiana, 2 PHIL. L.J. 8 (Part I) and 63 (Part II),
86-88 (1915) ; GAMBOA 80-83; FRANCISCO 446-500.
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continental Europe. The Spanish language became the language
of the government, the courts, and the dominant economic
groups.6
With the acquisition of the Islands by the United States in
1898, the Philippines came under the control and administration
of a country and people dominated by the traditions of the com-
mon law.7 After increased experience with self-government and
pursuant to the Tydings-McDuffie Law, 8 it was given common-
wealth status in 1935, and complete independence in 1946. De-
spite advances, in many respects the Philippines remains an
"undeveloped" country, with consequent myriad problems.
Of course, the coming of the Americans in 1898 did not carry
with it an automatic substitution of law. In accordance with
principles of international law, local private law generally re-
mained in effect.9 The policy of the Americans was against
unnecessary changes in private substantive law. In his instruc-
tions to the Taft Commission in 1900, President McKinley
stated:
"The main body of the laws which regulate the rights
and obligations of the people should be maintained with as
little interference as possible. Changes made should be
mainly in procedure, and in the criminal laws to secure
speedy and impartial trials and, at the same time, effective
administration, and respect for individual rights."' 0
In public law and, as we shall see in greater detail, in procedural
law, the substitution of sovereignties brought about early and
far-reaching changes. Over a period of time, influences in other
areas of the law became more or less extensive. 1 Although, as
before, the various local languages of the Islands continued,
6. Elementary education was largely in the hands of the church and instruc-
tion by the friars was in the various native dialects, despite a movement both
from Spain and from the Filipino reform group that instruction should be in
Spanish, the latter hoping in this way to get for the people greater access to the
power structure. A relatively small percentage of Filipinos had, however, gone
through secondary schools and colleges and learned Spanish. TAYLOR, THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP 33-34, 72-73
(1964).
7. From 1899 to 1902, there was a bloody conflict between Filipinos and
Americans. See 2 ZAIDE, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 212-26
(1957).
8. Act of U.S. Congress of March 24, 1.934 (48 Stat. 456), approved by the
Philippine Legislature on May 1, 1934. FRANCISCO 526.
9. See American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. (U.S.) 511, 542 (1828).
See FRANCISCO 509.
10. The President's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900.
11. See FRANCISCO 502, 512-21.
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English gradually became the common language of government,
courts, schools, and the dominant economic groups. 12 The Ameri-
can legal tradition was looked to as the basis for innovation.'8
In an excellent article appearing in 1915,14 the author made a
plea that the Philippines retain its civil law status, and not
become a common law jurisdiction, apparently reflecting pro-
fessional concern then current in the Islands. What has resulted
is a mixed jurisdiction, analogous to that prevailing in other
"mixed" legal systems - such as Louisiana, Scotland, South
Africa, Ceylon, and Quebec - a system having its roots in both
of the two great legal systems of the Western world, the civil
and the common law. What has the Philippines taken from one
and what from the other? Why, and with what effect? How
does "Western" law function in this Asian environment? How
has independence affected the prior legal systems? Interesting
though these questions are,15 the purpose of this brief article is
more restricted - a discussion of several aspects of the pro-
cedural system which has emerged from this intriguing context.
COURT STRUCTURE
The judicial system established in 190116 by act of the Philip-
pine Commission 17 was patterned in part along American lines
and in part along the antecedent Spanish system.'" The present
system is an outgrowth of that established in 1901.19
12. Today, English, Tagalog (added in 1940), and Spanish are all official
languages of the Philippines. The first two, however, are by far the more widely
used.
13. See FRANCISCO 502, 512-21.
14. Laurel, What Lessons May Be Derived by the Philippine Islands from
the Legal History of Louisiana, 2 PHIL. L.J. 8 (Part I) and 63 (Part II) (1915).
15. For some general discussions, see Chester, Criminal Procedure in the
Philippines, 42 AM. L. REV. 116 (1908) ; Fisher, Some Peculiarities of Philippine
Criminal Law and Procedure, 19 VA. L. REV. 33 (1932) ; Gilmore, An Emperiment
in Government and Law in the Philippines, 16 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1930) ; Gilmore,
The Development of Law in the Philippines, 16 IOWA L. REV. 465 (1931) ; Gil-
more; Philippine Jurisprudence-Common Law or Civil Law?, 16 A.B.A.J. 89,
134 (1930) ; Harvey, The Administration of Justice in the Philippine Islands, 9
ILL. L. REV. 73 (1914) ; Johnson, Courts of the Philippines, Old, New, 14 MICH.
L. REV. 300 (1916) ; Lobingier, Blending Legal Systems in the Philippines, 21
LAW Q. REV. 401 (1905) ; Lobingier, Civil Law Rights through Common Law
Remedies. Beneficial Result of the Blending of the Two Great Systems of Law
in the Philippine Islands, 20 JRnID. REV. 97 (1908) ; Noble, Development of Law
and Jurisprudence in the Philippines, 8 A.B.A.J. 226 (1922) ; Selph, A Brief
Outline of the Growth of Philippine Law, 23 WASH. L. REV. 301 (1948).
For interesting discussions dealing with aspects of public law in the Philip-
pines, see the recent Symposium, 40 WASH. L. REV. 403 (1965).
16. Act No. 136 of the United States-Philippine Commission. See I MORAN,
COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 8 (1963) [hereinafter cited as MORAN].
17. For discussion of the Philippine Commission, see infra:
18. See Harvey, The Administration of Justice in the Philippine Islands, 9
ILL. L. REV. 73, 77-95 (1914) ; FRANCISCO 521.
19. For discussion of the present-day system, see 1 MORAN 8-75.
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Aside from various special tribunals, 20 the courts are organ-
ized in a four-tier system. At the apex is the Supreme Court,
then the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and finally
Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts.21 The judges of all
four tiers are officials appointed by the President, with the ap-
proval of the Commission on Appointments,2 2 who in absence of
misconduct or incapacity are entitled to serve until age seventy.2
There are several interesting provisions relative to the Su-
preme Court and Court of Appeals. Apparently to avoid "one-
man decisions" by the eleven-Justice Supreme Court, the Consti-
tution provides that a case shall be considered first by the Court
as a body, with the conclusions determined by them in advance
of assignment for opinion writing.24 Normally, the agreement
of six Justices is required for judgment; but to hold a law or
treaty unconstitutional or impose the death penalty, a concur-
rence of at least eight is required.25
Instead of several courts of appeal situated in various places
throughout the country, there is but a single Court of Appeals,
composed of eighteen Justices, with its permanent office at
Manila.2 6 Although authorized to sit en banc, it usually sits in
separate divisions of three judges eachY.2  When a case is heard
20. 1 MORAN 57-75.
21. For discussion of jurisdiction of the various courts, see 1 MORAN 31-57.
22. I MORAN 9, 13, 17, and 24. The Commission on Appointments is com-
posed of twenty-four members, twelve from the Senate and twelve from the House
of Representatives, elected by these bodies on the basis of proportional representa-
tion of the political parties therein. The President of the Senate is e.T officio the
Chairman of the Commission. CONST. OF THE PHIL. art. VI, § 12.
23. Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Appeals are
removable from office by impeachment (1 MORAN 10, 14) ; judges of Courts of
First Instance, by the President of the Republic, upon recommendation of the
Supreme Court, after hearing (1 MORAN 23) ; and justices of the peace and
municipal court judges, by the President of the Republic, on his own motion or
on recommendation of the District Judge of the Court of First Instance (1 MORAN
30).
24. CONST. OF THE PHIL. art. VIII, § 11.
25. In the absence of the required eight votes, a contested law or treaty is
to be deemed constitutional. If the requisite eight votes for the imposition of
the death penalty are unobtainable, the law provides that the punishment next
most grave is to be imposed (assuming, of course, that at least six justices
concur in affirming the conviction). In the latter connection, it should be noted
that, whenever a trial judge imposes the death penalty, the case is automatically
to 'be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and the entire case, including factual find-
ings and sentence, is subject to review, whether or not the defendant has taken
a formal appeal. Rep. of Phil. Act No, 296 of 1948, § 9. Rules of Court, Rule 122,
§ 9. See 1 MORAN 10 and 4 MORAN 314-316; REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
Book 1, 559-62 (1965).
26. For discussion of the organization of the Court of Appeals, see 1 MORAN
13-16.
27. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is authorized to sit in two
separate divisions unless Congress otherwise provides. CONST. OF THE PHIL.
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by a division of three judges, all three must agree for judgment;
otherwise, two additional judges are assigned to the case. The
President of the Philippines, under certain conditions, is empow-
ered to authorize divisions of the Court of Appeals to sit else-
where ;28 but this is not widely utilized. Both the Supreme Court
and the various divisions of the Court of Appeals generally sit
at Manila, except during the two or three "summer" months of
April-June, when both the Supreme Court and the Court of Ap-
peals move to the delightful "summer capital" of Baguio, a
mountain resort area.
Although a discussion of the allocation of jurisdiction be-
tween the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals is beyond
the scope of this brief article,29 it should be noted that appar-
ently the Court of Appeals was designed as a means of relieving
the very overcrowded dockets of the Supreme Court.30 The
Court of Appeals is given fairly large jurisdiction, especially
to review factual determinations, but the Supreme Court is still
unduly encumbered, its dockets much too crowded.31 It appears
that a reorganization of appellate jurisdiction is needed, with
a transfer of far more of the Supreme Court's direct and com-
pulsory appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court could thus function in the main as a "writ"
court (as does the United States Supreme Court) with power
through the exercise of discretion to select the cases appropriate
for review by the country's highest tribunal. In this way, inor-
dinate delays at the apex of the system could be effectively
eliminated, and the whole system much improved. Of course,
this plan would probably necessitate the appointment of addi-
tional justices to the Court of Appeals, but this should be no
great obstacle. Although Manila is still the "hub" of the coun-
try, the locus of most important litigation and readily accessible
by air from other centers of population, it seems to this writer
that it would also be desirable for divisions of the Court of Ap-
peals to sit more often in cities other than Manila and thus
take justice closer to the people.
art. VIII, § 4. Congress has acted to preclude this possibility. Act No. 296 of
1948, Sec. 9.
28. 1 MORAN 16.
29. For discussion of the jurisdiction of the two courts, see 1 MORAN 37-45.
30. The court of appeals was established shortly after the Philippines be-
came a Commonwealth in 1935, abolished in 1945 after the liberation of the
Philippines, but reestablished shortly after independence in 1946. 1 MoAN 13.
See FRANCISCO 536.
31. See discussion p. 20 infra.
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ADOPTION OF EARLY PROCEDURAL CODES
By the end of 1901- about three years from Admiral
Dewey's victory at the Battle of Manila Bay 32 - Philippine civil
and criminal procedure had been completely revamped along
American lines, and the judicial structure reorganized.3 3 The
rapid change-over in procedural law is in sharp contrast with
developments in Philippine substantive law. American policy,
as we have seen, was definitely against precipitous change in
private substantive law.34 During the course of time, it is true
that more and more American substantive law was in fact
adopted,3 5 but this "reception" of American law was by no
means universal. In areas closest perhaps to the ordinary citi-
zen, those traditionally regulated by civil and penal codes, Phil-
ippine law remains basically Spanish in origin. 6
Whereas substantial change in basic civil law would no doubt
have been resented (and there seems to have been general agree-
ment by both Americans and Filipinos that it should be left in-
tact), there appears to have been equal or greater agreement by
all concerned that radical changes in procedural law, both civil
and criminal, were greatly needed.37
After the treaty of peace had been signed 8 and even before
it was ratified, President McKinley appointed a commission,
headed by President J. G. Schurman of Cornell University, to
visit the Philippines and, inter alia, to make recommendations as
to what changes should be made in order to ameliorate the con-
dition of the people and improve public order. A month after
32. May 1, 1898.
33. See p. 3 supra.
34. See p. 2 supra.
35. See FRANCISCO 512-21.
36. The present penal code of the Philippines is the Revised Penal Code which
went into effect January 1, 1932. it is based on the Spanish Penal Code of 1870,
which went into effect in the Philippines in 1887. See GAMBOA 86. In 1950,
the Code Commission submitted to the Congress a draft for a new code, See
FRANCISCO 542. This proposed code has not been adopted and there is currently
a movement to up-date the existing code. Even if the contemplated current
changes were adopted, the substantive criminal law would remain basically Spanish
and the dominant theory of punishment, retribution. See papers prepared in con-
nection with the Conference on Criminal Law Reform held at the Law Center of
the University of the Philippines July 14-16, 1965.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, which went into effect July 1, 1950, re-
placed the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which went into effect in the Philippines
the same year. See GAMROA 85-86, and FRANCISCO 540-42.
37. Harvey, The Administration of Justice in the Philippine Islands, 9 ILL.
L. REv. 73, 81 (1914) ; Fisher, Some Peculiarities of Philippine Criminal Law
and Procedure, 19 VA. L. RFv. 33 (1932).
38. December 10, 1898.
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its arrival early in 1899, the Commission issued a statement
promising the people that:
"A pure, speedy, and effective administration of justice
will be established, whereby the evils of delay, corruption,
and exploitation will be effectually eradicated."39
Testimony taken by the Commission 40 indicated that both civil
and criminal procedure were unduly complex, expensive, and
time-consuming.
Upon the return and report of the Schurman Commission,
the President sent the Taft Commission, which on September 1,
1900, acquired power to legislate for the Philippines, subject to
the overriding authority of the President. As noted above, in
his instructions to the Commission, President McKinley demon-
strated the concern of the United States government about ad-
ministration of justice in the Islands. 41 '
Before the Commission assumed its duties, however, radical
reform in criminal procedure had already taken place via mili-
tary order (General Orders No. 58) issued by the American
Military Governor, April 23, 1900.42 Containing only 110 rela-
tively brief sections, General Orders No. 58 was a short, straight-
forward outline of American criminal procedure, and an even
briefer summary of the most basic concepts of American evi-
dence law. 43 Although it expressly left intact those provisions
39. Quoted in Harvey, The Administration of Justice in the Philippine Islands,
9 ILL. L. REV. 73, 75 (1914).
40. See 2 REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT 23-24
(1900).
41. For an excerpt from these instructions, see p. 2 supra.
42. General Orders No. 58, as subsequently amended, is set out in 4 MORAN
350-378.
43. An obvious critic of the prior system, Enoch H. Crowder, who helped draft
the new procedural code, outlined its effects, which were summarized as follows:
"(1) The requirement of a specific complaint or information, charging but
one offense; (2) preliminary examination with witnesses, with immediate decision
as to holding the prisoner, abolishing the interminable and secret sumario; (3)
the right of being confronted by the witnesses, of cross-examination, of compulsory
attendance of witnesses for defense, of exemption from testimony against one's
self-all the methods of the open trial, in place of the secret or semi-secret
procedure of the Civil-law countries, and the right also of appeal in all cases;
(4) the privilege of demurring to an insufficient complaint and of pleading a
former judgment or jeopardy; (5) the right of joint defendants to be tried sep-
arately; (6) the right of new trials in cases of errors of law or newly discovered
evidence; (7) the extension of such procedure, in a simple form, to the justices'
courts; (8) the making of all persons, including defendants, competent witnesses,
instead of excluding the accused and his relatives and employees; (9) evidence
to be relevant and the best of which the case might be susceptible, doing away
with the former free admission of hearsay evidence; (10) extending the privilege
of bail not only to lighter offenses, but to all offenses not capital, or where proof
or presumption of guilt was strong [sic] ; (11) introducing the speedy remedy of
habeas corpus writ, instead of the theoretical assurance in the Spanish law of
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of prior law not inconsistent with the new code,44 it was so
broad in its sweep that it in fact supplanted the great body of
the prior procedural law.45 Significantly, it did not adopt one of
the most basic aspects of American criminal procedure - the
jury. Also, of great importance, it expressly retained prior
law authorizing a person injured by a criminal offense to take
part in the criminal prosecution and, as an incident of the crim-
inal action, to recover civil damages. Both of these outstanding
differences between Philippine and American procedure will be
discussed in greater detail subsequently.
Reaction of the Filipinos to the new procedural system was
very favorable. Speaking of General Orders No. 58, Chief Jus-
tice Arellano stated:
"This law, based upon the accusatory system, has abol-
ished the inquisitorial period so derogatory to the rights of
the accused, and which was the foundation of our former
criminal procedure; the time formerly taken up by this in-
quisitorial system without the right of intervention on the
part of the accused, which at times would be prolonged for
years, dependent upon the difficulty of investigation, has
been saved; the long period of preventive punishment suf-
fered by the many persons during the long summary ex-
amination is now avoided, which said examination was car-
ried on only for the purpose of investigating the commission
of a crime and whether any person was guilty thereof; the
new procedure provides for complete equality between the
accuser and the accused, between the prosecution carried
on by the Government and the defense of his personal lib-
erty and security interposed by the defendant; a brief pro-
ceeding, which becomes and is public from its initiation,
fully provides all that is necessary for a complete defense,
and is an absolute safeguard of personal security; this,
undoubtedly is the greatest benefit conferred upon the in-
habitants of this country. '
'46
'speedy trial'; (12) safeguarding the issuance and execution of the search-war-
rants." 1 LE Roy, THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES 279 (1914), citing
McArthur's Report, 1900, appendix AA.
44. Section 1, General Orders No. 58.
45. See FRANCISCO 514.
46. 1 LE Roy, THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES 279-80 (1914), citing
McArthur's Report, 1900, appendix GG. Another justice of the Philippine Su-
preme Court, Justice Gregorio Araneta, stated: "This reform has met with gen-
eral approval and applause, and is looked upon as one of the most positive
'benefits obtained from the government established in these Islands." Araneta,
Organization of Police and Judiciary, CABLENEWS-AMERICAN YEARLY REvIEW
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In March, 1901, by the Spooner Amendment,47 the United
States Congress expressly conferred upon the President of the
United States governmental authority over the Philippine Is-
lands. The President thus no longer had to rely upon war pow-
ers for authority, and his prior action in granting the Taft
Commission legislative authority was in effect ratified.4  On
July 4, 1901, by Executive Order, the head of the Commission,
William Howard Taft, was named Civil Governor4" of the
Islands.
Adopted by the Commission as Act 190 on August 7, 1901,50
the new code of civil procedure constituted a wholesale adoption
of procedure then prevailing in the United States. Act 190 also
contained a number of provisions in effect adopting American
rules of evidence. 51 Its promulgation had been preceded by ex-
tended hearings, in which prominent members of the bench and
bar, Filipino and American, had been heard. 52 For much the
same reasons giving rise to the dissatisfaction with prior crim-
inal procedure, there was dissatisfaction with the existing civil
procedure- delay, technicality, expense. 53 Although patterned
after prevailing American civil procedures, 54 there were signifi-
cant differences, perhaps the most important of which was the
non-adoption in the Philippines of the American jury system.55
Of special note also is the fact that, because of its civilian heri-
tage, there was in the Philippines no dichotomy between law
and equity, and the new procedural code fortunately created
none. Praise of the new procedures was lavish. 56
Number 32 (1911), quoted in MALCOLM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PBILTPPINE
ISLANDS 682 (1916).
47. The amendment was a provision inserted in the Army appropriation bill.
Act of U.S. Congress of March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. 910).
48. FRANCISCO 503-504.
49. The title was thereafter changed to Governor-General. See FRANCISCO 504.
50. The new code went into effect on October 1, 1901.
51. Sections 273-347, Act 190 of the Taft Commission, August 7, 1901.
52. See REPORTS OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION 210 (1900-1903).
53. Harvey, The Administration of Justice in the Philippine Islands, 9 ILL.
L. REV. 73, 81 (1914).
54. Many of the provisions, it appears, were taken from the California Code.
See Ylagan, A Practical Program of Procedural Development or Reform for the
Philippine Islands, 7 PHIL. L.J. 241 (1928).
55. See discussion infra.
56. Dean C. Worcester said of the Philippine Commission: "They have re-
sulted in simplifying organization, in decreasing the possibility of corruption
and partiality, and in diminishing the cost of litigation and the time which it
requires." 1 WORCESTER, TIHE PHILIPPINES, PAST AND PRESENT 400 (1914).
George Malcolm said that "[t]he greatest contribution to the jurisprudence
of the Islands was a Code of Civil Procedure." MALCOLM, GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 685 (1916).
The Manila Times said: "With such reformation of the laws as the Commis-
sion has already accomplished and that which it has in view, it will be impossible
1965]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
POST-COMMONWEALTH PROCEDURAL CODES AND THE
RULE-MAKING POWER
After successive stages in self-government, 7 and after nu-
merous Philippine requests for complete independence, 58 the
United States Congress in 1934 adopted the Tydings-McDuffie
Law59 providing that, after a ten-year transitionary period as a
commonwealth, the Philippines should be a completely independ-
ent country. In accordance with the terms of this act, elected
Filipino delegates met in 1934 to frame their Constitution, the
document which was to govern them not only during the Com-
monwealth, but thereafter as well.
From the standpoint of procedure, it is interesting that the
Convention was held during a period when movement for pro-
cedural reform was particularly strong in the United States.
The enabling act authorizing the United States Supreme Court
to formulate uniform rules of civil procedure for federal district
courts had just been passed.60 The Filipinos were quite aware
of American thinking and developments of the period, and the
views of such men as Pound and Sunderland were cited. 61
On the urgings of Vicente Francisco,6 2 the Constitutional
Convention adopted a provision giving rule-making power to
the Philippine Supreme Court,6 subject, however, to the power
of the Philippine Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement the
for the administration of justice to be retarded as in the past with the system of
challenging and dallying until the delay became paramount to a defeat of justice
itself. Cases will be able to be brought to trial without the vexations and delays
that have attended the trial of causes under former methods." MANILA TIMES,
April 23, 1901, p. 1. See also Harvey, The Administration of Justice in the
Philippine Islands. 9 ILL. L. REV. 73, 97 (1914).
57. Act of U.S. Congress of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 691)-Philippine Bill;
Act of U.S. Congress of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 545)-Jones Law.
58. See 2 ZAIDE, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 299-314
(1957).
59. Act of U.S. Congress of March 24, 1934 (48 Stat. 456).
60. The enabling act (48 Stat. 1064) was passed June 19, 1934, and the
Philippine Convention convened July 30, 1934.
61. 2 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
No. 56, 594-97 (October 4, 1934).
62. Later Ambassador to the United Nations and member of the Philippine
Senate.
63. CONST. OF THE PHIL. art. VIII, § 13. The provision reads as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on plead-
ing, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines."
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rules. The procedural codes which had been patterned after
American procedures and adopted during the early period of
American sovereignty64 had remained basically intact, and they
along with other procedural legislation were by the Constitution
automatically repealed as statutes and converted into rules of
court. Thereafter, integrated "Rules of Court," promulgated by
the Philippine Supreme Court, went into effect on July 1, 1940,
a comprehensive work regulating civil procedure, criminal pro-
cedure, evidence,6 5 and admission to the practice of law. In large
measure, the work was a restatement and regrouping in more
logical sequence of prior law and jurisprudence. 6 But it was
more than a mere restatement; it was greatly influenced by
modern procedural developments, especially the then new United
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the words of Chief
Justice Moran of the Philippine Supreme Court, it adopted:
"new methods of procedure, such as, a more liberal joinder
of claims and parties; greater flexibility in the amendment
of pleadings; the abolition of demurrer and its substitution
with the motion to dismiss; suppression of general denial in
answer; allowance of new system of counterclaims, cross-
claims, third party claims, fourth party claims, etc. in a
single proceeding to avoid multiplicity of suits; a more ef-
fective system of bill of discovery which does away with
that old and obnoxious practice of secrecy and surprises
in the preparation and trial of cases; institution of pre-trial;
summary judgments in all kinds of actions; uniformity
of appeals; shortening of periods within which pleadings
may be filed, proceedings taken, and adjournments allowed,
etc." 67
In part to provide procedural implementation of the sub-
stantive provisions of the Philippine Civil Code, which went
into effect in 1950, the Supreme Court commenced revision of
64. See supra.
65. In light of current discussion in the United States as to the authority
of the United States Supreme Court to promulgate rules of evidence for the fed-
eral district courts [see Green, To What Extent May Courts under the Rule-
making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence? (Ross Prize-Winning Essay, 1940),
26 A.B.A.J. 482 (1940) ; and A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and
Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States Dis-
trict Courts (Report of the Special Committee on Evidence to the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
1962], it is interesting that in the Philippines the authority to issue "rules con-
cerning pleading, practice and procedure" is deemed to include authority to issue
rules of evidence. See Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 (1948) ; and 1 MORAN 78.
66. Moran, Foreword to the First Edition, contained in 1 MORAN xi-xiii.
67. 1 MORAN xii.
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the Rules of Court in 1958. Going into effect on January 1,
1964, the new Rules of Court are a retouched version of the
1940 Rules, retaining the basic procedural system.
THE ABSENCE OF THE JURY SYSTEM
Philippine adjective law reads in the main like American
law. One of the most characteristic features of Anglo-American
procedure, however, the jury system, is absent. Why was it not
transplanted along with the rest? What are the consequences of
its non-adoption? The complete answers to these obvious ques-
tions are not altogether clear.
When the Schurman Commission made its recommendations
to President McKinley6 s as to the steps that should be taken to
improve the administration of justice in the Philippines, it did
in fact recommend that trial by jury be instituted in "due
time," 60 but this recommendation was never implemented. It
must be remembered that from 1899 to 1902 Americans and
Filipinos were engaged in the bloody encounter which Ameri-
cans call the Philippine Insurrection and Filipino historians call
the War for Philippine Independence, 7 and this may well have
been a factor in the rejection of the 1900 recommendation of
the Schurman Commission.
Early in the period of American sovereignty, however, prac-
tically all other of our basic procedural safeguards were extended
to the Philippines .7 The non-availability of jury trial, even for
American citizens in the Islands, was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court.7
2
Factors contributing to initial rejection of the jury system
probably included the following: Filipinos had had no experi-
ence with juries; their traditions and cultural patterns were
quite different from those of Britain and the United States;
general educational level was low;73 and there was no single
common language which could be understood by witnesses and
jurors throughout the Islands.
68. See supra.
69. 1 REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT 125 (1900).
70. See 2 ZAIDE, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 212-26
(1957).
71. See The President's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, April 7,
1900. See FRANCISCO 507-08, 512-13.
72. U.S. v. Dorr, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). See discussion in Fisher, Some
Peculiarities of Philippine Criminal Law and Procedure, 19 VA. L. REv. 33, 34-36
(1932).
73. See TAYLOR, THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS OF
PARTNERSHIP 72-73 (1964).
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Early in the American period, a step in the direction of the
jury system was in fact taken. In the civil procedure code which
went into effect October 1, 1901, a middle course was adopted
- an optional assessor system7 4 which could have been a bridge
between the judge trial method and the jury system.7 5 The
code stipulated that, upon the request of either party, two lay
assessors were to be selected to advise the trial court. Although
the responsibility for ultimate decision remained with the court,
written dissents of the assessors could be taken into considera-
tion on appeal. In time, the assessor device was extended to
criminal cases,76 but it appears to have been rarely used in either
area. 77 Although there is no reference in the 1940 Rules of
Court to the assessor system, provisions with respect to it were
incorporated in the 1964 Rules 78 -not, it appears, because of
74. Act 190 of the Taft Commission, August 7, 1901, sections 57-62 for trial
in justice of the peace courts, and sections 153-161 for trial in the courts of first
instance, set out in 2 MORAN 570-74.
75. The Philippine Commission said: "While the conditions here are for the
present unsuited to the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon system of jury trials,
provision is made for the selection of assessors from the residents of the munici-
pality or province best fitted by education, natural ability and reputation for
probity to assist in the trial of actions and to advise the judge of his determina-
tion, and securing the right of review of the facts by a higher court in case the
assessors shall certify that in their opinion the finding of facts and the judg-
ment are wrong. The provisions for assessors apply in courts of the justices of
the peace as well as in courts of first instance. This system is one that was
adopted under the Treaty of Berlin for use in Samoa under the protectorate, and
has long been usefully employed in British and German colonial possessions. The
employment of assessors is useful not merely as an aid to the judge but also as
giving a greater safeguard to the parties, and as a means of education for the
people." REPORTS OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMfISSION 212 (1900-1903).
76. See Act No. 267 (1901) ; Act No. 2369 (1914) ; Act No. 2520 (1915).
77. See Justice George Malcolm's dissenting opinion in Barberi v. Concepcion,
40 Phil. 320, 324 (1919), and statement of Dean Vicente G. Sinco in SINco,
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 347 (1962).
78. Rule 32 of the 1964 Rules of Court provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Preparing list of assessors.-The judge, with the assistance
of the governor of the province or the mayor of the chartered city where the
court sits, and the provincial or city fiscal, shall prepare a list of the residents
of the province best fitted by education, natural ability, and reputation for
probity, to sit as assessors in the trial of actions. Such list shall contain not less
than ten and not more than twenty-five names, and shall be retained in the office
of the clerk. The name of any person may be stricken from the list, at any time,
upon the order of the judge, upon his becoming satisfied that the name ought
to be stricken out by reason of the death, permanent disability, or unfitness
of the person named, and in case names are so stricken out, other names shall
be added in their place, to be selected as provided in this section.
"SEC. 2. Rights of parties to have assessors, and manner of selecting them.-
Either party to an action may, twenty (20) days or more before the trial, apply
in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such
application, the judge shall direct that assessors shall be provided, and that the
parties forthwith appear before him for the selection of the assessors. If the par-
ties cannot agree on the choice of two assessors from the list provided for in the
preceding section, the assessors shall be selected from the aforesaid list in the
following manner, in the presence of the judge or clerk: the plaintiff shall strike
out from the list one name; then the defendant may strike out another, and so
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any great attachment for the device, but because the Philippine
Supreme Court had held that its rule-making authority did not
give the Court the power to delete it. 79
For many of the same reasons contributing to the rejection
of the jury system during the early stages of American rule,80
the Philippines still do not have a jury system. Filipinos do not
lament the absence of the institution; in fact, there has never
been any substantial movement to establish it."' The overwhelm-
ing majority of Filipinos with whom the writer has discussed
the matter feel that it would not be in the best interests of the
country to adopt jury trial. They talk of the character and tra-
ditions of the people, the sectional differences, and allude also
on, alternately, the parties shall strike out names, until but two remain on the
list. The remaining two shall be the assessors to sit in the trial; but if one or
both of them are disqualified by law to sit as assessors, then the judge or clerk
shall draw one name or more, as the case may be, by lot, from those stricken out,
and the person or persons thus drawn shall act as asssessors, unless disqualified
by law, in which case the vacancy shall be filled by lot, as above provided.
"SEC. 3. Summoning assessors.-The persons so selected as assessors shall,
under the seal of the court, be summoned to attend and serve as assessors in the
action, and the summons for that purpose shall be served in the same manner
as other writs or summonses.
"SEC. 4. Failure of assessors to attend.-If any person, summoned to act as
assessor, fails, without lawful excuse, to attend at the trial, or at any adjourn-
ment thereof, or to continue to serve throughout the trial, he shall be liable as for
contempt of court.
"SEC. 5. Exrcusing a88e8ors.-The court may, on reasonable cause shown,
excuse from attendance generally, or in any particular case, any person sum-
moned, or liable to be summoned, as assessor, and may, for like cause, discharge
from attendance, in any particular case, any person who is acting as assessor
thereon.
"SEC. 6. Compensation of a88e88ors.-Each assessor shall receive a compen-
sation of ten pesos (10) per day for the actual time by him employed in the
trial of the action and in advising the judge as to the decision thereof, to 'be
advanced out of the provincial or city funds but to be'taxed as costs against
the defeated party and then refunded to the province or city concerned.
"SEC. 7. Oath of asse88or.-Before entering upon the performance of his
duty, in any action, each assessor shall be sworn by the judge, or by the clerk
of the court, to the faithful and honest performance of his duties as such assessor.
"SEC. 8. Duties of as8e8sors.--The duties of assessors, when their aid is
invoked as herein provided, shall be to sit with the judge during the trial of an
action and to advise him in the determination of all questions of fact involved
therein; but the final responsibility for the decision must rest with the judge.
"SEC. 9. Effect of dissent of assessors.-If one or both assessors shall be of
the opinion that the findings of fact in the judgment in the action was wrong.
he or they shall certify, in writing, his or their dissent therefrom and their
reasons for such dissent and sign such certification, which shall be filed with the
other papers in the action. In case such dissent is filed, the appellate court, on
appeal, shall give to the dissent aforesaid such weight as in its opinion it is
entitled to, and render such judgment as it finds just."
79. See 2 MORAN 153.
80. See supra.
81. For Philippine discussion of the jury system, see articles in TirE FILIPINO
HOME COMPANION 9 (June, 1958) ; Laurel, Some Drawbacks to the American
Jury System; Quisumbing, On the Jury System for the Philippines; Fernandez,
Jury System for the Philippines (urging the establishment of trial by jury in
capital cases).
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
to the possibilities of juror corruption. Clearly they prefer to
entrust decision making to trained jurists rather than to un-
trained jurors. They have the intimate knowledge of the peo-
ple, their traditions, culture, and sense of justice which this
outsider lacks.
In the American procedural system, the jury is, of course,
a core institution, greatly affecting our entire legal system. Its
absence from Philippine procedure likewise has far-reaching ef-
fects. It might be supposed that, because of the non-availability
of juries, trials in the Philippines are quite expeditious, but such
is far from the case. Instead of a trial being a continuous hear-
ing in which all of the available testimony is adduced and heard,
it is only too frequently a fragmented affair extending over
months and even years. In Philippine courts, after one or two
witnesses are heard, the trial is often continued until a later
date, and this process seems to go on and on. Of course, such
piecemeal trial is not a necessary consequence of judge trial, but
it does not preclude it, and a number of other factors pro-
mote it.82
The absence of a jury affects the whole atmosphere of a trial,
and the way a lawyer goes about his work. In the Philippines,
the judge is the decision maker; the forensics designed to im-
press jurors and arouse their sympathy are absent. Court hear-
ings in the Philippines thus tend to be much less dramatic than
in the States.
The fact that there are no juries has considerable effect
upon the role of the appellate courts. The decisions of the judge
are subject to review, both on facts and law, and on reversal
the appellate court has the power to render the judgment which
it feels the lower court should have entered.m
Although never adopting the jury, the Philippines have the
Anglo-American rules of evidence, which in their formulation
were so heavily influenced by the jury context in which they
evolved. It appears, however, that in the Philippines, because
of the judge trial and the power of the appellate court to review
both facts and law, exclusionary rules are much more liberally
applied.8 4 Philippine trial judges often tend to let in evidence
82. For discussion of delay in Philippine proceedings, see infra.
83. 1 MORAN 40. See Fisher, Some Peculiarities of Philippine Criminal Law
and Procedure, 19 VA. L. REV. 33, 44-45, 50 (1932). See Rule 124, § 11; Rule
125, § 1.
84. Fisher, Some Peculiarities of Philippine Criminal Law and Procedure, 19
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which in an American jury trial would be excluded. It is seldom
that a case is reversed on appeal because of a trial court's erro-
neous admission of evidence, only for the rare erroneous and
prejudicial exclusion. Objections of counsel consequently tend
to be much less frequent, for they have much less chance of suc-
cess either in the trial court or on appeal.
The role of the jury in personal injury litigation is one of
the best examples in American law of the impact of mode of
trial on substantive results. Sympathetic American juries have
tended to be very generous with "other people's" money, and
their plaintiff verdicts have encouraged the growth of liability
insurance. The prevalence of liability insurance has in turn
resulted in even more generous plaintiff verdicts. This "so-
cialization of the risk" is by no means so present in the Philip-
pines as in the United States. Although liability insurance is
available, relatively few seem to take advantage of it. Personal
injury judgments seem quite low,"5 even considering the differ-
ent standard of living, and the absence of jury trial is in all
probability a contributing factor.
JOINDER OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS
There are two major differences between the procedural law
of the Philippines and that of the United States. One is the non-
availability in the Philippines of jury trial; s6 the other is the
Philippine procedure by which both civil and criminal liability
may be, and generally are, adjudicated in a single proceeding.
When by General Orders No. 5887 American-type accusatorial
criminal procedure was substituted for the prior Spanish in-
quisitorial system, civil-criminal joinder was one of the few
Spanish procedural devices retained.88 Philippine substantive
VA. L. REV. 33, 48-49 (1932). See SALONGA, PHIIPPINE LAW OF EVIDENCE 8-9
(1955).
85. See REYES, TIiE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book 1, 793-802 (1965).
86. See discussion supra.
87. Issued April 23, 1900. See discussion supra.
88. For a discussion of this procedure in modern Spanish law, see Murray,
A Survey of Criminal Procedure in Spain and Some Comparisons with Criminal
Procedure in the United States, 40 N. DAK. L. REV. 7, 16-18 (1964). For dis-
cussion of analogous procedure in French law, see Howard, Compensation in
French Criminal Procedure, 21 MOD. L. REV. 387 (1958) ; and Pugh, Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV.
1, 12 (1962).
Section 107, the pertinent section of General Orders No. 58, read as follows:
"XIV.-RIGHTS OF PERSON INJURED BY THE OFFENSE
"SEC. 107. The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be
injured by the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the
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law provides that "every person" liable criminally for a viola-
tion of the Revised Penal Code is also liable civilly.8 9 Proce-
durally, the dual liability (civil and criminal) generally result-
ing from a prohibited act is normally determined in a single
proceeding. Unless the injured civil party expressly waives his
civil action, or "reserves" his right to institute it, his civil action
is impliedly instituted along with the criminal action?0  Al-
though prosecution of the criminal offense is under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor, 9' the injured party who
has not waived or reserved his civil action may intervene in the
criminal proceeding. 2  The public prosecutor retains ultimate
control of and responsibility for a case, but he may permit the
attorney for the injured party to conduct the prosecution. 3 Gen-
erally, the criminal action takes precedence over a separately-
instituted civil action, which if already commenced must be sus-
pended until final judgment in the criminal action is reached.94
In certain cases, however, notably those involving infringement
of basic civil liberties and physical injuries, a civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought
and prosecuted during the pendency of the criminal action, pro-
vided this right has been reserved.9 5
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a detailed dis-
cussion of the provisions governing the civil-criminal joinder,96
offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same
shall not be held to be abridged by the provisions of this order; but such person
may appear and shall 'be heard either individually or by attorney at all stages
of the case, and the court upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment
against him for the damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however,
be the duty of the promoter fiscal to direct the prosecution, subject to the right
of the person injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a
legal right."
89. REVISED PENAL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, arts. 3 and 100. See REYES,
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book 1, 755-809 (1965). Of course, the ambit of the
article is not so universal as it sounds. There are, for example, some violations
of the Penal Code where there is no injured civil party. See discussion in 4
MORAN 67 and 1 REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book 1, 755-56 (1965).
90. Rule 111, § 1.
91. Rule 110, § 4. The public prosecutor in the Philippines is called the fiscal,
as in Spain, and is an appointed official.
In certain cases, as for example adultery and concubinage, prosecution may
not be had except on the complaint of the injured civil party, who loses the power
if she pardons the offender. Article 344, REVISED PENAL CODE; RULES OF COURT,
Rule 110, § 4. This approach also is Spanish in origin. See Murray, A Survey of
Criminal Procedure in Spain and Some Comparisons with Criminal Procedure in
the United States, 40 N. DAK. L. REV. 7, 17 (1964).
92. Rule 110, § 15, quoted in footnote 96, infra.
93. See 4 MORAN 8.
94. Rule 111, § 3, quoted in footnote 96, infra.
95. Rule 111, § 2, quoted in footnote 96, infra.
96. The provisions of the Rules of Court particularly applicable are:
Rule 110, § 15:
"SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.- Unless
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but it should be noted that the importance of the provisions is
greatly enhanced by the fact that, with respect to injuries to
persons and property, Philippine substantive criminal law is
much broader in scope than American law, embracing many
harms which under American law would be civilly actionable
only. Under article 365 of the Philippine Revised Penal Code,
any act which would be criminal if committed intentionally is
also criminal if committed by "simple" or "reckless" imprudence.
The penal sanction, however, is reduced as the result of the less
blameworthy state of mind. The fact that injury to person and
property caused by simple imprudence is actionable criminally
(when coupled with the procedure for civil-criminal joinder)
means in effect that the vast majority of what in the United
the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right
to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions
of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecu-
tion of the offense."
and Rule 111:
SECTION 1.- Institution of criminal and civil actions. -When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute
it separately.
SEC. 2. Independent civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right
is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.
"SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.-In all cases not in-
cluded in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
"(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be insti-
tuted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil
action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the crim-
inal action ;
. "(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered;
"(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases,
the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in
the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution
of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
"SEC. 4. Judgment in civil action not a bar.-A final judgment rendered
in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a crim-
inal action.
SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of pre-judicial question.-A petition for the
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre-judicial ques-
tion in a civil case, may only be presented by any party before or during the
trial of the criminal action."
See discussion in 4 MORAN 61-77. See also the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code particularly applicable, Articles 38, 39, 100-113, and the discussion
in REYES, RErVIsE PENAL CODE, Book 1, 535-550, 755-809 (1965).
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States would be ordinary tort litigation, in the Philippines is
subject to adjudication as an adjunct of criminal proceedings.
In practice, the injured civil party is usually unrepresented
by private counsel in the criminal proceeding, for it appears that
only too often the claimant is unable to afford to pay private
counsel in advance of judgment. Proceedings are so long and
recovery so small that attorneys may be unwilling to handle
such cases on a contingency fee arrangement.97 Personal injury
litigation seems to be a relatively unlucrative field for Philippine
lawyers, occupying a much less significant part of law practice
than it does in the States. It appears that civil claims are often
compromised, and that once this is done the public prosecutor
frequently does not press the criminal case. Thus, the broad
'criminal liability in effect acts as a stimulant to force settle-
ments of civil claims. Interestingly, the criminal law governing
punishment also contains an inducement to payment of civil
liability. In many instances, unless a convicted party satisfies
the judgment for civil damages, he is obligated to serve addi-
tional time in prison, called "subsidiary imprisonment." 98
97. Although there are provisions in the Rules of Court which might be uti-
lized to appoint counsel to represent indigent civil parties, it appears that, in
practice, counsel for indigent civil claimants in civil or criminal proceedings are
rarely, if ever, appointed. There is, however, a system for appointing and com-
pensating (to some extent) attorneys for indigent defendants in criminal cases.
See Rule 138, Sections 31 and 32.
98. Article 39, PHILIPPINE REVISED PENAL CODE, provides:
"ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - "If the convict has no property with which
to meet the pecuniary liabilities mentioned in paragraphs 1st, 2nd and 3rd of
the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability
at the rate of one day for each 2 pesos and 50 centavos, subject to the following
rules:
"1. If the principal penalty imposed be prisid5 correccional or arresto and
fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine and pecuniary liabilities
referred to in the preceding paragraph are satisfied, but his subsidiary imprison-
ment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall
it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be
counted against the prisoner.
"2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary im-
prisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted
for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light
felony.
"3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prisidn correccional
no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
"4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement
in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during
the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the
same depriviations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
"5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered
by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from reparation of the damage
caused, nor from indemnification for the consequential damages in case his finan-
cial circumstances should improve; but he shall be relieved from pecuniary
liability as to the fine."
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DELAY
Delay is a disease that can gnaw at the vitals of any pro-
cedural system. It has been seen that, when American-type civil
and criminal procedure was substituted for the prior Spanish
procedure, inordinate delay constituted a major criticism of
the old system. Delay, however, is not the peculiar affliction
of any particular system; it is a constant threat to all. Its causes
are varied, and elimination of some does not preclude the pres-
ence of others. Although many of the former causes of delay in
the Philippines may have been removed (and it appears that ef-
ficiency and celerity were at least for a time in fact achieved),9,
delay is again a most serious problem in the Islands.
In many jurisdictions of the United States, especially in the
large metropolitan areas, there is also a delay problem of
monstrous proportions, but its impact is less pervasive. And
in many respects the causes, and hence the cures, are different.
Delay in the Philippines has reached the point that some
Philippine observers use very strong language indeed to describe
it. In 1957, a judge of the Court of First Instance stated:
"But conspiracy of circumstances renders delay so in-
evitable that, believe it or not, the aforesaid eight-year in-
action in the Cabansag ejectment case skrinks into insignifi-
cane when compared with many other civil cases pending
in court for as long as the last fifteen years, and criminal
cases as old as five years. Indeed, notwithstanding the super-
human efforts required of judges of Courts of First Instance
by our Secretary of Justice to completely hear and decide at
least thirty cases a month, the backlog of CFI cases through-
out the Philippines has piled up instead of diminished dur-
ing the last eleven years." 00
99. "The Philippine system of procedure, as an instrument for the enforce-
ment of criminal law, is far superior, it is believed, to that employed in the United
States. The procedure is swift, but no essential right of the accused is sacrificed
to celerity." Fisher, SOME PECUIARITIES OF PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE, 19 VA. L. REV. 33, 49 (1932).
100. Morfe, DELAYED JUSTICE, OR RAILROADED "JUSTICE" - WICI?, 22
LAW. J. 529 (1957).
Mr. Salvador Marifio, Secretary of Justice, writing in 1964, commented:
"In a civil suit, attorney's fees grow until they sometime equal or exceed
the amount of damages awarded. A poor person, badly in need of money
and impatient with the apparent procrastination of the courts, may finally
agree to accept a small sum in full payment of a large debt rather than
undergo a further period of uncertainty. In such cases, delay is a form of
unfairness that should not be tolerated."
Mariflo explains delay in disposition of court litigation, THE SUNDAY CHRONICLE
(Manila), August 23, 1964, p. 7.
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In 1961, an editorial in a leading professional journal lamented,
"The judicial system of the country is almost paralyzed."'' l In
1945, the year before independence, there was a backlog in the
Court of First Instance of 8,471102 cases, rising to 70,556 by
1957,103 and to some 80,000 in 1961.104 The condition of the
dockets today seems little improved.
One of the causes for the backlog buildup was that, ap-
parently because of political considerations, 10 5 many of the va-
cancies in authorized judgeships went unfilled.1 6 It is reported
that, because of this, in 1961 over one-half of trial courts were
without judges. 017 Today, also, there are a number of unfilled
vacancies. Although in our own country similar political con-
siderations have hampered adequate staffing of our courts, 08
it appears that politics in the Philippines is far more enervating
than in the United States.
Another of the major causes of delay in the trial courts has
already been noted, the practice of piecemeal trials. Instead
of a case being tried continuously until completion, very often
there are bit-by-bit hearings over a prolonged period of months
and even years. Frequently, direct and cross-examination of a
witness are separated by continuances while bits and pieces of
other cases are tried. Inefficiency and delay of inordinate pro-
portions result.
The causes for the split-trial practice are not altogether clear.
101. Editorial: DEPLORABLE STATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 26
LAw. J. 193 (1961).
102. Morfe, DELAYED JUSTICE, OR RAILROADED "JUSTICE" - WHICH?, 22
LAw. J. 529 (1957).
103. Ibid.
104. See Sabado, WHEELS OF JUSTICE GRIND SLOWLY-VERY SLOWLY,
WEEKLY GRAPHIC MAGAZINE, May 31, 1961, p. 10, reprinted in 6 JOURNAL OF
THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS 145 (1961); and Editorial: DEPLORABLE
STATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 26 LAW. J. 193 (1961).
105. Political differences between the President (the appointing authority)
and members of the Commission on Appointments (the confirming authority) as
to the composition of the Commission on Appointments. See discussion in foot-
note 22 supra.
106. Editorial: DEPLORABLE STATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 26
LAW. J. 193 (1961) ; and Sabado, WHEELS OF JUSTICE GRIND SLOWLY-VERY
SLOWLY, WEEKLY GRAPHIC MAGAZINE, May 31, 1961, p. 10, reprinted in 6 JoU-
NAL OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS 145-156 (1961).
For a proposed remedy to the appointment snarl in the Philippines, see Edi-
torial: POLITICS AND THE BENCH, 26 LAW. J. 193 (1961) ; and Editorial: MAN-
NER OF APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES, 26 LAW. J. 194 (1961).
107. Editorial: DEPLORABLE STATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 26
LAW. J. 193 (1961).
108. See, for example, the discussion in Karlen, Federal Jurisdiction and Prav-
tice, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 117-118 (1959), reprinted in 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
AXERICAN LAW 639-40 (1959).
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The absence of jury trial'0 9 makes it possible, but is itself not
the cause. Some Filipinos say the practice results from the
crowded condition of the dockets and the fact that the lawyers
are so busy, but surely the efficiency of both court and attorney
would be enhanced if cases were heard in their entirety, one trial
at a time, thus eliminating much lost motion. Perhaps the prac-
tice of piecemeal trial is a present-day reflection, in different
procedural context, of Spanish procedures to which the profes-
sion and the public had long ago become habituated.110 It may
be, however, as has been suggested to the writer by a prominent
Filipino, that the practice is due in part to cultural factors.
Filipinos do not seem as pressed for time as Americans; they
seem more willing to wait for "solutions," and delay allows time
for "cooling off," time for hard feelings to soften. Another
factor may be in judicial attitudes, greater willingness on the
part of the judge to let the parties take their time, a desire to
delay the ultimate day when one of the contestants must be
declared the loser. Some Filipinos have suggested to the writer
that a cause of delay is the system by which Filipino attorneys
are sometimes paid for their services. Often they are paid by
court appearances, and thus even for the plaintiff lawyer delay
is not necessarily a financial hardship. Contingency fees are
much less frequent in the Philippines than in the United
States;"' thus, this built-in incentive to celerity is not as often
present.
Whatever the reasons for it, there is a very high incidence
of continuances during trial, despite efforts to reduce it. The
Rules of Court prohibit adjournments during trial for "a longer
period than one month for each adjournment, nor more than
three months in all, except when authorized in writing by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.""112 The rule, however,
does not appear to have achieved the desired results."l1 A new
provision was inserted in the 1964 Rules:
109. See discussion 8upra.
110. See Murray, A SURVEY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SPAIN AND SOME COM-
PARISONS WITH CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 37 TUL. L. REV. 399,
400 (1963) ; and Murray, A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SPAIN AND SOMZ
COMPARISONS WITH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 40 N. DAK. L.
REV. 7, 8-9 (1964), for discussion of modern Spanish civil and criminal pro-
cedures.
111. A reason for less use of the contingency fee appears to be due in part
to the low quantum recovered and, circularly, the delay. See discussion supra.
112. Rule 22, § 3.
113. For discussion of the provision, see 1 MORAN 486, 493.
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"SEC. 6. Annual conference on pending cases.-At the
end of one year from the day the trial proper has commenced,
and every year thereafter, if the trial has not been termi-
nated, the judge shall call the parties and their counsel to
a conference to devise ways and means of terminating the
trial. A statement of the result of the conference, signed by
the judge and counsel, shall be attached to the record, show-
ing the reason why the trial has not terminated; number and
names of witnesses yet to be presented by the parties; any
facts stipulated during the conference; the efforts exerted
to settle the case and similar matters. Copy of the statement
shall be furnished the Supreme Court and the Secretary of
Justice within ten (10) days after such conference. ' 1 14
The Supreme Court dockets themselves, however, are severely
encumbered; and, until reorganization of appellate jurisdiction
is achieved, 115 it will be difficult for it effectively to implement
even this modest provision.
A bill introduced in the last session of the Philippine Con-
gress" 6 by Senator Diokno would transfer administrative super-
vision over the court system from the Department of Justice
to the Supreme Court. To assist the Supreme Court in exer-
cising the new authority, the bill would create the Office of the
Administrator of Courts, with broad responsibilities. This type
of approach has proved very effective in many jurisdictions of
the United States and would seem to fit in very well with the
rule-making power of the Philippine Supreme Court."7 Its adop-
tion in the Philippines would probably prove very beneficial.
In an interesting article discussing the various causes and
cures of delay, Mr. Salvador Marifio, Secretary of Justice,
stated:
"Maintaining popular confidence in the courts requires
a radical change in fundamental attitudes and concepts. The
basic problem is to overcome inertia, since the root cause of
delay lies in its being taken for granted. The change to be
made is in a state of mind where lawyers and judges expect
114. Rule 22, § 6. See 1 MORAN 493.
115. See discussion supra.
116. Senate Bill No. 778, Fifth Congress of the Philippines, Fourth Ses-
sion (1965).
117. See discussion supra.
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delay and adjust their work habits accordingly, so that even
clients reluctantly resign themselves to the situation."" 8
Whatever the causes and whatever the solutions, it is quite
clear that inordinate delay is a most serious problem in the
Philippines. In many parts of the United States, particularly
in the large urban centers, delay is also a very real problem.
Availability of speedy and inexpensive justice through the courts
is the procedural goal of both countries, 119 its attainment a con-
stant challenge.
118. Mariflo explains delay in disposition of court litigations, THE SUNDAY
CHRONICLE (Manila), August 23, 1964, p. 7.
119. See Rule 1, U.S. FEDERAL RULES or CivIL PROCEDURE, and Rule 1, § 2,
PHILIPPINE RULES OF COURT.
